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Abstract. Assessing the vulnerability of an enterprise’s infrastructure
is an important step in judging the security of its network and the trust-
worthiness and quality of the information that flows through it. Cur-
rently, low-level infrastructure vulnerability is often judged in an ad hoc
manner, based on the criteria and experience of the assessors. While
methodological approaches to assessing an organisation’s vulnerability
exist, they are often targeted at higher-level threats, and can fail to ac-
curately represent risk. Our aim in this paper therefore, is to explore a
novel, structured approach to assessing low-level infrastructure vulnera-
bility. We do this by placing the emphasis on a controls-based evaluation
over a vulnerability-based evaluation. This work aims to investigate a
framework for the pragmatic approach that organisations currently use
for assessing low-level vulnerability. Instead of attempting to find vulner-
abilities in infrastructure, we instead assume the network is insecure, and
measure its vulnerability based on the controls that have (and have not)
been put in place. We consider different control schemes for addressing
vulnerability, and show how one of them, namely the Council on Cyber
Security’s Top 20 Critical Security Controls, can be applied.
1 Introduction
Finding vulnerabilities is a difficult and arduous task [39]. Nevertheless, assess-
ing the vulnerability of computer systems and networks to attacks is a critical
enterprise security activity. This includes two major types of vulnerability assess-
ment: low-level (e.g. penetration tests or automated vulnerability scans looking
for vulnerabilities such as MS08-0671) and high-level (e.g. ISO 27001 [20] au-
dits looking for the existence of appropriate cryptographic storage). Both are
required for various types of security risk assessments, and assist in making crit-
ical business decisions, demonstrating an organisation’s security credentials, and
determining the risk of compromise of its information assets. In the language
of risk assessment, vulnerabilities are identified and then mitigated by controls.
These are taken into consideration (sometimes with additional factors such as
specific threats or threat actors) when used to assess the security of the scoped
infrastructure.
1 MS08-067 is a low-level vulnerability in the Windows Server Service that allows
remote code execution when sent a specially crafted RPC request.
2This paper aims to explore the possibility of a more structured and rigorous
approach to assessing the overall vulnerability of infrastructure against low-level
vulnerabilities (e.g. whether its OpenSSL implementation is vulnerable to Heart-
bleed [17]). Our approach attempts to provide an unbiased assessment of infras-
tructure vulnerability, based on external controls from well-researched sources.
We scope our work away from high-level risk analysis, where there are already
several approaches in use (e.g. ISO 27001) and instead intentionally focus on
the low-level technical vulnerability of an infrastructure. Moreover, at this stage
we avoid higher-level factors (e.g. security procedure and policy) and do not
attempt to judge the overall risk to the infrastructure.
Basing our approach on the presence or absence of controls is a different ap-
proach to previous technical assessment methodologies. Most proposed academic
methods base their judgement on attempting to count the low-level vulnerabil-
ities present, and using this as the basis for their assessment of the security of
the network, infrastructure or system [1][18][21]. Similarly, within businesses,
assessment of low-level vulnerability is performed by vulnerability scanning or
penetration testing to discover and enumerate existing vulnerabilities on the net-
work. Instead, our low-level evaluation takes inspiration from higher-level risk
assessment methodologies, whose assessments are based on the existence (or lack
thereof) of controls that an organisation has in place. An example of these is
the ISO 27001:2013 standard, where auditors check to see whether a series of
controls have been implemented. These controls exist at a higher-level than the
vulnerabilities discovered by penetration testing or vulnerability scanning, and
include checks such as whether an access control policy is in place or whether
staff have been appropriately vetted.
With our approach, instead of basing the assessment on vulnerability lists and
the vulnerabilities present, we base the assessment on whether certain low-level
controls are in place. This is more in line with the higher-level risk assessments
such as ISO 27001. Whereas typical low-level vulnerability assessments assume
the network is secure unless found otherwise, we argue that the network should
be considered insecure until the necessary controls (relevant to that infrastruc-
ture) have been implemented. Unknown vulnerabilities will always exist and
will be impossible to defend against. Controls defending against a wide variety
of attacks (such as a whitelist-based firewall, or the use of a No Execute bit
against memory injection attacks) provide a greater guarantee than firefighting
individual vulnerabilities. This is in line with a growing belief that networks and
systems should be considered insecure by default [7][8][26].
Despite the need to assess low-level vulnerability, there is not a generally ac-
cepted way of doing so. Different methods exist for measuring the higher-level
risks to an infrastructure (e.g. ISO 27001), but there is no established way of
providing the low level equivalent. On the one hand there exists technical testing
such as vulnerability scanning tools (e.g. Nessus [38]) and penetration testing
techniques, which are widely employed but often unstructured and unsystem-
atic. On the other hand there are several highly-structured proposed academic
methods, which have not been successfully adopted into widespread use.
3In the remainder of this paper, we present related work that is relevant to this
discussion (Section 2), describe our approach (Section 3) and discuss an exam-
ple (Section 4). We then critically reflect on our proposal (Section 5) and draw
conclusions and discuss areas for future research (Section 6).
2 Related Work
Currently, there are several accepted methods for organisations to assess in-
frastructure vulnerability. Typically these involve some type of audit or risk
assessment being carried out. These can range from comparing the infrastruc-
ture to standard procedural checklists (e.g. ISO 27000), to hands on technical
audits (e.g. penetration tests). Each type of assessment takes into account dif-
ferent factors, considerations and controls, to give feedback on the strengths and
weaknesses of the system.
One problem assessors face when evaluating network security is that the as-
sessment may be biased towards their own knowledge and previous experiences.
Left to their own devices, assessors may be prone to letting the systems they
have previously worked with affect the assessment of that which they are cur-
rently assessing. To combat this, strict high-level information security assessment
methodologies have been created such as ISO 27001 [20] and COBIT [19]. These
aim to provide an explicit framework for assessors, to ensure that a structured
process is maintained, while also reducing the risk of bias affecting the results
of the assessment. Assessors are then trained to follow these frameworks and be
objective in their assessment.
One of the criticisms of these approaches is that they are simplistic, and can be
performed as checklists of controls. Recent research aims to address this. Bhat-
tacharjee et al. [5] proposed a formal method of risk assessment that aims to take
other factors into account, such as asset and vulnerability dependency. Szwed
and Skrzynski [37] also consider this, with a proposal based on Fuzzy Cognitive
Maps. They argue their lightweight risk assessment methodology is easy to ap-
ply, and more appropriately takes into consideration the value of assets.
While widely accepted assessment methodologies are in place for the procedural
side of information security, there is nothing analogous when it comes to assessing
technical vulnerabilities. Technical assessors and penetration testers frequently
rely on the experience of their previous assessments to judge the overall vul-
nerability of the network that they are testing. Technical assessments of this
kind focus on specific low-level vulnerabilities (e.g. MS08-067 present on a spe-
cific host) and do not have a structured way of building on these to provide an
overall assessment of the vulnerability of an infrastructure. Executive summaries
are often included to provide this bigger-picture assessment, but as there is no
accepted process it is often tainted by the testers’ prior experience [41].
Modern penetration testing arguably began with Karger and Schell’s evaluation
of Multics for the US Air Force [22][23]. They performed a thorough evaluation
of Multics, and found several ways to bypass its multi-level user control system.
Penetration testing is at times a controversial approach, and Valli et al. [41]
4recently assessed some of the weaknesses of relying on penetration testing. They
argue that penetration testing is often not the best process to base security de-
cisions on, and can be driven by ulterior motives. In contrast, Shah and Mehtre
[33] provide an overview of current penetration testing techniques, and describe
how they can be beneficial for an organisation.
Ken Thompson’s ‘Reflections on Trusting Trust’ [39] is the classic paper on the
difficulty of detecting vulnerabilities. He demonstrates the possibility of a vulner-
ability invisible even to thorough source code review, and gives a clever example
of a vulnerability that would be difficult to detect via automated means. Nev-
ertheless, vulnerability scanners are a common tool used for the detection of
low-level vulnerabilities in systems and networks. Examples of scanners include
Nessus [38], OpenVAS [29] and Core Impact [9], which are used in many pro-
posed academic methods for assessing infrastructure vulnerability [18][21].
In practice, both vulnerability scanning and penetration testing work by tar-
geting specific systems and devices, and sequentially testing for the existence of
vulnerabilities, generally by attempting to exploit them with non-malicious pay-
loads. Details of these vulnerabilities can be found in comprehensive databases
such as CVE Details [14] or NIST NVD [28], where there is also information
available on their impact (via CVSS scores). Vulnerability scanning involves
scanning the infrastructure with automated tools which are designed to find and
fingerprint vulnerabilities, while penetration testing involves performing the pro-
cess manually, resulting in a more thorough analysis. If the infrastructure proves
vulnerable to an attack it is recorded and presented in a report. A report is then
produced listing the vulnerabilities that were discovered on the host.
There has also been a noteworthy amount of academic research on assessing
infrastructure vulnerability. These primarily aim to judge the vulnerability of
infrastructure based on the low-level vulnerabilities detected. Jajodia and Noel
[21] have proposed a method for assessing the vulnerability of network topologies
based on the accumulative vulnerabilities of paths into and out of the network.
These vulnerabilities are detected using scanners such as Nessus [38], and can be
used with the network intrusion detection system Snort [34] to correlate received
alerts. Ahmed et al. [1] describe a method for assessing the vulnerability of a
network based partly on the vulnerabilities that have historically been present.
They find that if a service has a history of vulnerabilities, there is a higher prob-
ability that the service will be vulnerable in the future.
Holm et al. [18] analyse the effectiveness of different rubrics for judging systems
vulnerabilities through CVSS scores. They base their work on the time taken to
compromise systems in the cyber-defence exercise Baltic Shield [16], an exercise
which pitched a red team of attackers against blue teams of defenders trying
to prevent the compromise of a network. The known vulnerabilities of the sys-
tems had their CVSS scores combined using several methodologies proposed by
other researchers, and the assessment of these methodologies was compared to
the actual time taken to compromise the systems. The study found that simple
methodologies only looking at the most serious vulnerabilities present in each
system or service (based on the security belief of ‘weakest link in the chain’)
5were not as effective at estimating the difficulty to compromise the network as
those that took more information into account. Teodor et al. [35] followed on
from this by presenting a modelling language for analysing the security of en-
terprise system architectures. They found that analyses using their model can
be as accurate as assessments performed by security professionals. In a similar
vein, Feng et al. [15] recently proposed a method to consider the relationship
between risks. Their approach uses Bayesian networks to consider not just the
vulnerability, but its context within an infrastructure.
To summarise, most of the research into proposed methods of low-level vul-
nerability analysis are based on the presence of vulnerabilities. Despite these
proposals, none of these methodologies appear have gone on to widespread use
on live systems. This is in contrast to the higher-level vulnerability assessment
methodologies (e.g. ISO 27001), which are primarily controls-based. While there
are many possible reasons for this, one major factor may be the difficulty in de-
termining which low-level vulnerabilities are present. While processes that rely
on knowing which low-level vulnerabilities exist may work in controlled tests,
they are likely to be more difficult to implement when analysing live systems.
Not content with the frequently ad hoc nature of low-level information secu-
rity defences, there have been several attempts to produce standardised lists of
controls. Two examples relevant to this discussion are the Council on Cyber
Security’s Top 20 Critical Security Controls [12][10] and Australian Signals Di-
rectorate (ASD) 35 Cyber Security Mitigation Strategies [3].
The Council on Cyber Security’s Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CSC 20) is a
set of 20 security controls based on an observed need for a standardised controls
list of this type. It was drawn up by an array of ‘companies, government agen-
cies, institutions, and individuals from every part of the [security] ecosystem’
[10], based on an ‘offence informs defence’ approach. They have been widely
adopted by other organisations [30], including SANS [31] and the UK Centre for
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) [13]. The CSC 20 is regularly
updated, and is on version 5.1 since its inception in 2012. An example of a CSC
20 control is: Limitation and control of network ports, protocols and services.
The ASD’s 35 Cyber Security Mitigation Strategies is a series of 35 controls
ranked in order of overall effectiveness at network protection. It places particu-
lar emphasis on their top 4 mitigation strategies, which they argue stop 85% of
targeted cyber intrusions [3]. It is written at a slightly lower-level of abstraction
than the CSC 20, and largely include similar and overlapping controls [11]. An
example of an ASD control is: Restrict access to Server Message Block (SMB)
and NetBIOS services (this example would be covered by the slightly-higher level
CSC 20 control mentioned above – i.e. Limitation and control of network ports,
protocols and services).
3 A Controls-Based Approach
Our approach to vulnerability assessment is based on the thesis that all in-
frastructures are vulnerable, and that this vulnerability can only be mitigated
6with the implementation of certain controls. This is similar to higher-level risk
assessment methodologies (e.g. ISO 27001). Using control schemes such as the
CSC 20, we are instead exploring the possibility of basing low-level vulnerabil-
ity assessments on the controls present. A system that correctly and securely
implements all controls is considered as secure as it can be under the scheme,
while a system that implements no controls is assessed as being insecure. This
view is supported by the growing belief that we cannot take the trustworthiness
of network infrastructure for granted [7][8]. Unfortunately devices are still often
not built with security in mind, and contain numerous undiscovered vulnerabil-
ities [32]. Instead of assuming technology is secure until proven otherwise, it is
prudent to consider it insecure until proven secure.
Instead of attempting to create an exhaustive list of vulnerabilities or controls
that affect infrastructure vulnerability, our approach relies on lists of controls
compiled from other sources. We see two primary advantages in doing so. Firstly,
the method itself can be static and not constantly changing. This makes the pro-
cess more robust, not dependent on specific vulnerabilities, and not impacted by
the changing vulnerability landscape. Secondly, there is already a large amount
of research into the most effective controls to address vulnerability. Instead of
replicating this work, we can build on it. Moreover, determining the vulnerabil-
ities or controls which have the most effect on infrastructure vulnerability is a
large and complex task, and far beyond the scope of this current paper.
Our approach follows a multi-step process. We envisage that the steps can be
repeated using different control schemes, without losing the overall structure of
the assessment. The approach is defined as follows:
Step 1 – Scope the infrastructure to be evaluated. When performing any security
assessment it is important to determine exactly which assets are to be covered.
This will allow the assessors focus on the area where risk has been identified,
and not spend time assessing assets not considered vital to the organisation.
This can be a complex process, and must consider the interdependencies within
and across the organisation.
Step 2 – Select the control list to be applied. Compliance with different control
lists will offer different levels of assurance to the infrastructure. Two control lists
that currently meet these requirements are the CSC 20 and ASDs 35 Cyber Secu-
rity Mitigation Strategies. Control schemes should be chosen with consideration
of the following criteria:
– It is appropriate for the infrastructure – e.g. the controls it contains are
relevant and provide relevant defences to the infrastructure being assessed.
– It is held in high regard with the stakeholders and industry – e.g. the control
list should be an accepted national or international standard.
– It is relatively up-to-date such that it addresses current vulnerabilities – e.g.
the control list addresses the current threats to infrastructure security.
Step 3 – Determine whether all controls are appropriate, and how to deal with
conflicts against the control set and the infrastructure. Not all controls will apply
to all infrastructures. For example, an external firewall is not necessary if the
network is airgapped. If a control is not relevant this will normally mean that
7the infrastructure is secure against the attacks that the control is used to defend
against. Continuing the example, the airgapped network is not vulnerable to
attacks from external networks.
Step 4 – Assess whether each identified control has been implemented, and whether
the level of implementation is appropriate and adequate. This is checked against
each control in the list, one at a time. For control lists that give multiple sub-
controls (as with the CSC 20, discussed in Section 4), it may be desirable to
further detail the assessment of the infrastructure’s compliance with the control.
For example, using logging:
– No Logging: No logging takes place.
– Local Logging: Logging exists but it is basic and localised (e.g. occurring in
Windows Event Viewer rather than a dedicated application).
– Centralised Logging: Logging occurs in a standardised output and is cen-
tralised (e.g. syslog format is stored in rsyslog).
Step 5 – Combine individual control assessments to give an overall assessment of
the infrastructure. Once the status of the relevant controls has been determined,
they can be combined to give an overall vulnerability score, a simplified heuristic.
If the controls were broken down into sub-controls, the assessment can take this
into account using the coverage of the sub-controls to give a finer granularity
of vulnerability score. There are certainly more intelligent ways of calculating
the network vulnerability score, in a similar way that there are more intelligent
ways of assessing the vulnerability of a network than adding up the scores of
its vulnerabilities [18]. Determining how to best consider controls to produce an
overall and meaningful network vulnerability score is a critical area for future
research if controls-based approaches are to be adopted.
4 Applying the Approach to a Scenario using CSC 20
To demonstrate and discuss how our method can be applied in practice, we have
applied it to an example network below.
Step 1 – Scope the infrastructure to be evaluated. The example network that we
are going to be analysing is a small network for 20 IT professionals. It is pri-
marily a Windows network, with two Windows 2008 Domain Controllers (DC)
and 20 Windows 7 laptops which can either connect directly to the network (if
they are in the office), or connect to the network via a VPN (if they are outside
of the office). As well as these, there are several internal servers offering services
to the staff, including file storage and bespoke applications for help with report
writing, issue tracking and code repositories. The network is connected to the
Internet which is protected by a firewall, and within the office there is a physical
Ethernet connection.
Step 2 – Select the control list to be applied. The control set that we will be
applying to this network is the CSC 20 [12]. The CSC 20 offers a comprehensive
list of low-level controls that are sub-divided into further sub-controls. These
controls are up-to-date at the time of the assessment, and are appropriate to the
infrastructure that we are assessing.
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conflicts against the control set and the infrastructure. While most of the con-
trols from the CSC 20 are valid and can be applied to our network, CSC 7:
Wireless Access Control is not applicable as the network does not have wireless
access. As this control is aimed at preventing unauthorised access from wireless
connections it is assessed that the network does not require this control, and can
be assumed secure against associated attack vectors.
Step 4 – Assess whether each identified control has been implemented, and whether
the level of implementation is appropriate and adequate. While it is not possible
to fully assess all CSC 20 controls within this paper, we assess the implementa-
tion of one control to demonstrate how the assessment is performed.
Within the CSC 20, each control can be further divided into sub-controls. For
example, CSC 1 - Inventory of Authorised and Unauthorised Devices, is divided
into 7 sub-controls. These range from having an automated asset discovery tool
(CSC 1-1) to using client certificates to validate and authenticate systems prior
to their connection to the network (CSC 1-7). Each of these sub-controls has
a property relating to their difficulty to implement. Sub-controls are listed as
‘quick wins’, visibility and attribution, configuration and hygiene, or advanced.
There are many ways these sub-controls can be combined to give the overall ef-
fectiveness of the defence against the vulnerabilities they are mitigating. While
there are several attempts at accumulating vulnerabilities’ risk to give an overall
assessment [6][25][27][40], no equivalent has been proposed for controls.
The method we will use for this example is simply to divide the sub-controls in
place by the total sub-controls for that control. For example, if there are seven
sub-controls for a control, and four of them are in place, that control will receive
a score of 0.57 (4/7). If there are nine sub-controls and eight of them are in place,
that control will receive a score of 0.89 (8/9). Using this method, an individual
score for all of the CSC 20 controls can be quickly calculated.
To assess the 19 remaining CSC security controls we must go through each of
them in turn. To give an example of the system, we will cover the controls in
CSC 5: Malware Defence.
CSC 5: Malware Defence looks at the different defences that are in place to
defend against malware. It has 11 sub-controls. A full listing of CSC 5 can be
found online [10].
The example network has thorough anti-malware practices in place. On their
workstations, DCs and other servers they have an enterprise malware solution
that is automatically updated and has receives new signatures periodically. This
software automatically scans email attachments and the contents of removable
media before they can be opened. In addition to this, they have both a be-
havioural and signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS). See Table 1
for the completed CSC 5: Malware Defence assessment sheet.
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5-1 Yes The network meets this requirement as they have the necessary antivirus
and host-based functionality deployed.
5-2 Yes Antivirus signatures are pushed out from a centralised repository.
5-3 Yes The systems have been configured to not auto-run content from removable
media.
5-4 Yes The antivirus software has been configured to automatically scan removable
media.
5-5 Yes Emails going into the organisation are scanned for malicious content before
the user receives them.
5-6 Yes Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) and Data Execution Pre-
vention (DEP) are enabled by default on Windows 7 and Server 2008.
5-7 No There is no system in place for monitoring the use of external devices, so
this requirement is not met.
5-8 Yes Both signature-based and behavioural IDS are running on the network.
5-9 No Although there are IDS in place, they only generate alerts when malware
is detected, and do not actively prevent its delivery.
5-10 No There is no incident response process in place for unrecognised malware.
5-11 Yes DNS query logging is part of their IDS solution.
CSC 5: Malware Defence Score: 0.727 (Yes - 8 / No - 11)
Table 2. Control Score
CSC 1: 0.8 Inventory of Authorised and Unauthorised Devices
CSC 2: 0.74 Inventory of Authorised and Unauthorised Software
CSC 3: 0.545 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
CSC 4: 0.777 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
CSC 5: 0.727 Malware Defences
CSC 6: 0.5 Application Software Security
CSC 7: N/A (1) Wireless Access Control
CSC 8: 0.666 Data Recovery Capability
CSC 9: 0.75 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
CSC 10: 0.5 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers,
and Switches
CSC 11: 0.5 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Servers
CSC 12: 0.545 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
CSC 13: 0.75 Boundary Defence
CSC 14: 0.925 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs
CSC 15: 0.667 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
CSC 16: 0.235 Account Monitoring and Control
CSC 17: 0.4 Data Protection
CSC 18: 0.333 Incident Response and Management
CSC 19: 0.688 Secure Network Engineering
CSC 20: 1 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
Final CSC 20 Vulnerability Score: 0.653
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Step 5 – Combine individual control assessments to give an overall assessment
of the infrastructure. Once the analysis is complete, the scores of each control
are combined to give the overall vulnerability score of the example network. The
overall vulnerability score for the entire example network is 0.639. See Table 2
for the completed CSC assessment sheet, with values for each CSC control.
This is a simplified example, but demonstrates how control lists can be used
to provide a potentially useful metric of vulnerability. This could easily be con-
verted into a Low, Medium and High rating (as is often used for penetration
testing and vulnerability scanning) or Fail, Partial and Pass rating (as is often
used for high level assessments) depending on how the organisation prefers the
information to be presented and how it is going to be used.
5 Reflection on the Approach, its Utility, and Acceptance
The aim of this paper is to explore the use and value in adopting a controls-based
approach to assessing infrastructure vulnerability, as opposed to the traditional
methods based on detecting and counting low-level vulnerabilities. Below, we re-
flect on the advantages and limitations of our approach, and compare it against
traditional analyses of low-level vulnerability. While this comparison is not ex-
haustive, it provides a critical reflection on the approach, including its benefits
and limitations, and situations where it may be most applicable.
5.1 Potential Advantages of Controls-Based Approach
1) More vulnerabilities exist than controls – While there many known vulnera-
bilities [14], the majority of these can be mitigated with a competitively small
number of controls. Indeed, the ASD strongly argue that 85% of targeted cy-
ber intrusions can be stopped with 4 controls [4]. This is because controls have
a one-to-many relationship with vulnerabilities, with one control mitigating or
removing many different vulnerabilities. For example, a ‘No Execute’ bit will
prevent many memory injection vulnerabilities.
2) It is quicker and more efficient to determine the presence of controls than
vulnerabilities – Finding the vulnerabilities present in a system is a time con-
suming and subsequently, often time-limited process. This is because of the large
number of vulnerabilities that could exist over an infrastructure. Regardless of
the infrastructure being tested, there will often be more potential vulnerabilities
than it is possible to check for [24].
In penetration testing, the time limitation is expressed in the time scoped for
the test. Whoever is scoping the assessment will judge how long the test will
need, and then the testers attack the network until that time is up. Penetration
testing gives diminishing returns over time. Given a five day test, many vulner-
abilities will likely be found over the first one or two days, and fewer will be
discovered towards the end of the week. While many vulnerabilities are easy to
test for (in part because of vulnerability scanners, which are themselves part of
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a penetration tester’s tool kit) the more esoteric vulnerabilities can take longer
to manually test for, and the majority of any in-depth penetration test will be
spent testing for these. With vulnerability scanning, the time is limited by the
signatures available to the scanner. When vulnerabilities are discovered, signa-
tures testing that vulnerability are written. These are generally a non-malicious
payload sent to the service to observe its response. These signatures take time
to write, and there are no vulnerability scanners that claim to find all vulnera-
bilities.
3) It is less risky to measure the presence of controls than vulnerabilities – While
vulnerability scanners can scan for the existence of many vulnerabilities, there
are exploits that it is either not possible, or not desirable, to test for (e.g. de-
nial of service vulnerabilities on live systems). This is in contrast to controls,
which have all been deliberately implemented by administration staff, ensuring
that someone is always aware of their presence. Related to that is the issue that
scanning or testing for vulnerabilities can have side effects. Performing scans of
devices, even relatively benign scans such as port scanning, can cause device
issues and crashes. More advanced tests (e.g. testing vulnerability payloads) can
cause increasingly complex problems, such as data corruption or putting a sys-
tem into an unknown state. Malware, in particular, can result in unwanted side
effects, and is a tool not often used in penetration tests (especially against live
systems) for this reason. Although this risk can be addressed by taking a virtual
image of the infrastructure to test against against rather than the live system,
this can be a complex and costly process. As a result, such virtualisation is not
performed routinely for vulnerability scanning or penetration testing.
4) Vulnerability-based risk assessment does not consider unknown vulnerabilities
– Zero day exploits will not be found by vulnerability scanners, and are unlikely
to be detected during penetration tests (depending on the nature of the vulner-
ability, and the skill, detection and time of the testers). In contrast, controls can
and do protect against zero day attacks. For example, Address Space Layout
Randomisation will protect against a buffer overflow attack whether the vulner-
ability it is exploiting is known or not. As a result, the vulnerability of a system
to zero day attacks is better measured by the controls it has in place, than its
vulnerability to other exploits.
5.2 Potential Limitations of Controls-Based Approach
1) The vulnerability landscape is constantly changing – New attacks (or even
whole classes of attacks) can be discovered, and an assessment methodology
should be flexible and able to take this into account. Most methodologies used
in practice attempt to do this by manually reassigning their assessment crite-
ria (or controls) periodically. With ISO 27001 this happened in 2013, with the
update from ISO 27001:2005 to ISO 27001:2013 making changes to the controls
(as well as the broader assessment methodology) that were included in the as-
sessment. While the control schemes we have discussed aim to take this into
account, there still needs to be a manual update and new version of the control
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list in order to do so.
2) Current methods of assessment already have traction and assessment within
industry – Penetration tests, vulnerability scans, and high-level information secu-
rity audits are already established within industry. There already exist trained
auditors and organisations who can perform these assessments, and there is
a demand and an acceptance of them within business. Compared to low-level
vulnerability-based risk assessments, using controls at this level is a relatively
unexplored idea. Low-level controls-based risk assessment needs a large amount
of development to give it the same maturity as the existing approaches.
While a lack of precedent may be fatal in other areas of organisational deci-
sion making, it is an even greater problem within the security industry. Security
status is often proven via certification or accreditation, and performing a new
approach that does not offer this greatly reduces the benefit of performing the
security evaluation in the first place.
3) Vulnerabilities with no known controls are not taken into account, regardless
of their presence – New attack vectors with no known controls are not taken
into consideration during a controls-based assessment. A good recent example
of that is BadUSB [36], which opened up an entirely new line of attacks that
had previously not been considered. As a result of this, there are few (if any)
controls in place to mitigate against it. This is in contrast with traditional pene-
tration testing and vulnerability scanning, which can consider new vulnerabilities
immediately upon their discovery. We saw this with Heartbleed [17], where vul-
nerability scanners were available to check for its presence the same day that
the vulnerability became public knowledge.
Control lists have to be manually updated with a new version produced before
a vulnerability is taken into consideration. Generally speaking, this is a bigger
weakness against new attack vectors (e.g. BadUSB [36]) than against new vul-
nerabilities (e.g. Hearthbleed [17]), as new vulnerabilities are often mitigated by
existing controls (due to the nature of the one control to many vulnerability
relationship). The control lists mentioned in this paper are attempting to stay
up-to-date with currently vulnerabilities, but this process is not always easy, and
will never be immediate.
4) More research is needed to find suitable methods for determining overall vul-
nerability – Simply adding the number of scores together to give a value is not as
thoroughly researched as many of the referenced vulnerability-based approaches.
This is inevitable given the amount of work already in this area. Ideally, to take
our work forward, some research and experimentation of that depth should be
repeated based on a controls-based approach.
5.3 Approach Acceptance
Ultimately, assessments of infrastructure vulnerability are often driven by busi-
ness interests. While an organisation may be able to ‘sell’ a new evaluation
methodology, this is not achievable or desirable from an academic perspective.
In order for any method of evaluating security to be successful, organisations
must see benefit in adopting it. In reality, the vulnerability and risk assessment
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market is dominated by established vendors, who have little incentive to change
their methodology.
One possible motivator for change is that the standard ways of assessing low-level
vulnerability (penetration testing and vulnerability scanning) are expensive. As
the majority of the proposed academic approaches [1][18][21] that we have found
are based on having pre-existing knowledge of the low-level vulnerabilities in
place, this cost exists with them as well. This expense is due to the high-level
of assessor skill required to correctly find and identify the vulnerabilities. Even
with vulnerability scanners, while they are easy to operate, they often report
false positives which require verification to be certain of their existence [42].
This high skill requirement is expensive, and one reason why penetration testing
is performed so sparingly.
The expense of finding low-level vulnerabilities contrasts with performing assess-
ments based on control lists. As seen with higher-level assessment (such as ISO
27001) it is possible for assessors to ensure that controls are in place without be-
ing highly skilled in the technology they are assessing. It takes a comparatively
small amount of training for assessors to be able to correctly identify that con-
trols are in place, and ensure that they are configured correctly. This difference
in required knowledge could result in controls-based assessments being more cost
effective to perform, and therefore make good business sense, and could help the
approach be applied to small and medium sized enterprises (which often have
difficulty justifying the resources required to perform security assessments [2]).
6 Conclusion and Future Work
A repeatable and accepted method of judging the low-level vulnerability of an in-
frastructure would be a useful tool in ensuring system and network security. We
argue that one achievable way to do this is transitioning from vulnerability-based
risk assessment to controls-based risk assessment. To this end, we proposed an
approach based on controls to assess the vulnerability of a computer infrastruc-
ture. We then illustrated with an example, how our approach could be applied
using a control set, namely the CSC 20, to assess an infrastructure’s vulnerabil-
ity. This presents a simple but effective method of using the sum of all offered
(sub-)controls to measure the overall control coverage.
The main difference between our method and earlier approaches is that prior
methods attempt to rate overall vulnerability based on the number of low-level
vulnerabilities found. We have discussed in depth why we believe this may not
be the ideal approach to the situation. While the method that we propose does
have drawbacks, we believe these are outweighed by the benefits. Detecting all
vulnerabilities is simply not possible, therefore measuring the controls is more
likely to give an accurate and achievable indication of true vulnerability.
In terms of future work, there are many avenues to pursue, particularly around
demonstrating the validity of this process. As seen with vulnerability-based as-
sessments, there are many different ways that the measured data can be com-
bined to give an overall evaluation of the risk to the network. A first step would
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be to apply our approach to real networks, and see how well the results corre-
late against other risk assessment methodologies. This approach could be taken
further by performing a similar assessment to Holm et al. [18], comparing dif-
ferent methodologies against the time-to-compromise of a known system. This
methodology could also be used to analyse how to best determine the vulner-
ability scores that our final assessment is based on. At this stage, our research
is primarily exploring the advantages to using a controls-based measurement
over a vulnerability-based one; repeating their work considering controls-based
assessments against vulnerability-based assessments, and comparing those to
time-to-compromise would be a key indicator of the validity of this approach.
Similarly, work should be conducted on the optimal way to combine compliance
over multiple controls to calculate a realistic vulnerability assessment. An ex-
ample of this would be looking at whether certain controls should be weighted
differently, or how a single major control failure should impact the overall assess-
ment of the infrastructure (i.e. the validity of the weakest link security model in
this context). In the example network (Section 4) we merely give a mean of the
number of controls that have been complied with. This is clearly a simplistic ap-
proach, and is unlikely to give the strongest indicator of the vulnerability of the
network. This is similar to other work which has been performed on assessing
overall vulnerability by the presence of low-level vulnerabilities [6][25][27][40].
One potentially viable way to do this would be to combine it with control lists
that have different levels of controls, e.g. the CSC 20 with ‘quick win’ controls
versus ‘advanced’ controls. It would be interesting to see which of these give a
better indication of the vulnerability of the network, and how this correlates to
the cost (both in time and resources) in implementing them.
There should also be further research into different control sets and their efficacy.
While the CSC 20 and ASD 35 were discussed in this paper, research should anal-
yse other control sets and how they are generated, to determine what actually
makes an effective set of controls. We should study which controls are the most
effective at increasing time-to-compromise, and how controls can be combined
to offer the most security.
Although this work is mainly intended to be an exploration into the utility
of controls-based, low-level risk assessment, we believe there could be genuine
benefit to exploring it further. Given the amount of work that has gone into
vulnerability-based risk assessment there is still a long way to go to reach that
level of maturity.
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